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APOCALYPSE DERRIDA 
"Are we to understand the eve as the guard mounted around the house or 
as the awakening to the day that is coming, at whose eve we are? Is there an 
economy of the eve? 
Perhaps we are between these two eves, which are also two ends of man. 
But who, we?" 
—"The Ends of Man" 
"Isn't the voice always that of the last man?" 
—"Of an Apocalyptic Tone Recently 
Adopted in Philosophy" 
"I try to keep myself at the 
limit of philosophical 
discourse. I say the limit 
and not death, for I do not 
at all believe in what today 
is so easily called the death 
of philosophy; (not, more-
over, in the simple death of 
whatever—the book, man, 
or god, especially since, as 
we all know, what is dead 
wields a very specific 
power)." (Positions, p. 6) 
"We must ask ourselves if 
there is not a recurrent epis-
tcmological structure that 
characterizes all statements 
made in the mood and the 
rhetoric of crisis." (Blind-
ness and Insight, p. 14) 
"At the very least, to be 
dead means that no profit or 
deficit, no good or evil, 
whether calculated or not, 
can ever return again to the 
bearer of the name. Only 
the name can inherit, and 
this is why the name, to be 
Can one's memoirs be written by another? 
If so, that act would certainly qualify as a kind of 
writing beyond the end of the book. Derrida is 
much known for his preoccupation with the 
discourse of ends, in fact several recent pieces 
play with and on the idea of apocalypse. Derrida 
deconstructs apocalyptic philosophy and yet is 
in a sense an apocalyptic philosopher. 
A memoir is typically a short, abridged 
history of oneself, not exactly autobiography. 
When written by another the plurality of mem-
oirs, of memory, becomes more apparent: 
"Memories of," "scattered," recollection con-
scious of dispossession of unified self. Inthecase 
of his Memoires for Paul de Man Derrida has 
subverted the plural not by imposing a unified 
voice ("he and I were one"), but rather by work-
ing through the play of two "individual" 
voices—the play within each and the play be-
tween them, the play in the brisure . 
Crisis rhetoric docs not play the same role 
for dc Man that apocalyptic discourse docs for 
Derrida. For dc Man, the crisis is backdrop to the 
critical thought of this century (an exemplary 
case is Husserl's crisis writing). The emphasis is 
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distinguished from the 
bearer, is always and a 
priori a dead man's 
name, a name of death. 
What returns to the 
name never returns to 
the living. Nothing ever 
comes back to the 
living." 
"Politically and 
historically (not just 
politically, unless one 
understand "politically" 
in the broadest sense of 
the word), it is we who 
have been entrusted with 
the responsibility of the 
signature of the other's 
text which we have 
inherited." (The Ear of 
the Other , pp. 7,51) 
"Unlike the other wars, 
which have all been 
preceded by wars of 
more or less the same 
type in human history 
(and gunpowder did not 
mark a radical break in 
this respect), nuclear war 
has no precedent. It has 
never occurred, itself; it 
isanonevent. The 
explosion of American 
bombs in 1945 ended a 
"classical," conventional 
war; it did not set off a 
nudearwar. The 
terrifying reality of the 
nudear conflict can only 
be the signified referent, 
never the real referent 
(present or past) of a 
discourse or text." ("No 
Apocalypse, Not Now," 
p. 23) 
"Neither God nor the 
sons of Shem (you know 
that Shem means 
"name" and that they 
bore the name "name") 
not on the end, or the limit, rather on the perma-
nence of the crisis as a state of flux which all-in-all, 
once recognized, etc., does not deter philosophers, 
critics, artists, etc. from carrying out their ap-
pointed tasks. Might I suggest that this view has as 
much to do with temperament as anything? Be-
yond this likelihood, though, is the greater breadth 
of Dcrrida's work—perhaps that is temperament 
too—the monumental scale of which creates in 
addition to continental land masses, roiling, still-
uncharted seas. Creates them, we see, as breath 
out, breath in, and halting stops when breathing is 
difficult, when late-twentieth century humanity 
chokes on modernity. (These stops are criticism 
materialized; these breaths a r e . . . (here the manu-
script leaves off 1.) 
One can get away with writing another's mem-
oirs—indeed, why not take the chance? One could 
even write the history of many-another, also a 
chance to be taken. What one cannot do and what 
one must not even attempt to do, is to write the 
history of everyone, of others in totality: this is not 
beyond the book, this act closes the book (game 
over, writing is infinite only under certain circum-
stances). The moment beyond the end of history 
docs not contain the m&mdfit which is the end of 
history. (The njjjm**nt beyond the end of history 
docs not contain the moment which is the end of 
history.) 
» 
Apocalypse, however, is not only the dis-
course of ends. To think so is perhaps a very recent 
usage, a post-WWIl/pre-WWHI (the precarious-
ncss of that slash: as division, as hinge) sense. In 
"Of an Apocalyptic Tone" Dcrrida is concerned 
with apocalypse as that which happens at the end 
of a certain kind of circuit—something (an histori-
cal tradition or trajectory in philosophy, in art, etc.) 
has run its course—and which reveals, through a 
kind of retrospection, just what had been going on: 
what sort of forces and operations were really at 
work. And, having brought about this sort of reve-
lation, apocalypse revalues human activities and 
therefore allows new things to begin. For example, 
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knew absolutely that 
they were confronting 
each other in the name 
of the name, and of 
nothing else, thus of 
nothing. That is why 
they stopped and 
moved on to a long 
compromise. We have 
absolute knowledge 
and we run the risk, 
precisely because of 
that, of not stopping. 
Unless it is the other 
way around: God and 
the sons of Shem 
having understood that 
a name wasn't worth 
it—and this would be 
absolute knowledge— 
they preferred to spend 
a little more time 
together, the time of a 
long colloquy with 
warriors in love with 
life, busy writing in all 
languages in order to 
make the conversation 
last, even if they didn't 
understand each other 
too well." ("No 
Apocalypse" p. 31) 
" . . . the West has been 
dominated by a 
powerful program that 
was also an untrans-
gressible contract 
among discourses of 
the end." ("Of an 
Apocalyptic Tone" p. 
80) 
"Symbolic condemna-
tions, given when they 
have been official, 
'Two years ago on 
January 28, the space 
shuttle Challenger 
exploded seventy-three 
seconds after liftoff. 
Despite that disaster, 
Wagner's Tristan, in "failing" to resolve its opening 
chord, ends one sort of tonality and initiates an-
other. Apocalypse, then. Is as much a discourse 
of continuity as of ends. Or, as long as apocalypse is 
a discourse of ends it is not a discourse of the end. 
What could be continuous with global nuclear 
war? What would be revealed? What could be born? 
For some who argue that confrontation is in the 
cards, the third world war began some years ago. 
And for some of these, crisis is an everyday condi-
tion, practically a lifestyle. They have seen a sign: do 
not, they have been told and are now telling others, 
add or take anything away from this letter. Well, 
what remains to be done, except to repeat this 
admonition ad infinitum ? The apocalyptic voice 
does not ask, "what's next?"; "next" is exactly what 
cannot be: the next of history, of philosophy; the 
after of teleology and eschatology. 
Howmight wedecodethe message to John, "Do 
not add or take away.. ."? Is it not after all a matter 
of strategies, of battle plans which must not be 
abridged for to do so would endanger lives? Is it not 
after all a question of seizing the time, seizing time, 
stealing the future? Is it not after all a problem of 
delicate balances, most centrally of competence and 
incompetence? Who or what rules the balance: is it 
God or chance? In fact, God is not revealed in the 
looming apocalypse, though a gaggle of voices pro-
claim his image in the mushroom cloud. Is this 
forgery? Forgery would seem to entail a substitu-
tion, but why not a substitution of presence for 
absence (as Lunacharsky had it, "God-building"), a 
memoir where there was none. There are of course 
many famous cases of such forged memoirs, almost 
always linking authenticity (authorship, authority) 
with property and control. (One would do well, 
then, to not immediately take such memoirs as gos-
pel.) 
Could Derrida represent for us the most ex-
treme communism? For Marx, in socialism property 
passes from capitalists to the proletariat, and in 
communism from proletariat to the people in total-
ity (including the "future people," In the sense— 
this is how Marx has to work the problem out, he 
cannot afford to simply be moral about this—of the 
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however, and despite 
continuing problems 
with the shuttle booster 
rockets, the National 
Aeronautics and Space 
Administration plans to 
launch two space 
shuttles, one in 1989 and 
another in 1990, each 
carrying a space probe 
utilizing what scientists 
have called the most 
toxic substance in the 
universe: plutonium. 
Each will contain more 
than enough plutonium 
to kill every person on 
Earth." (The Nation J a n . 
23,1988) 
Which brings up an 
important consideration 
concerning the Star Wars 
program. The idea with 
SDI is to shoot nuclear 
missiles down before 
they can hit their targets 
and detonate. Assuming 
the SDI plan could 
actually work—a 
proposition which seems 
highly doubtful—there is 
still the matter of the 
unexploded missiles 
falling to earth and 
scattering radioactive 
debris. In the event of a 
major unleashing of such 
missiles, this in itself 
would be enough to kill 
millions, if not billions, 
of people—and this 
aspect of SDI remains 
completely undiscussed 
in the mainstream 
media. 
have never disrupted 
diplomatic, economic, or 
cultural exchanges, the 
deliveries of arms, and 
geopolitical solidarity." 
("Racism's Last Word" 
"pcoplc-in-continuity"). Certainly, Dcrrida's text 
is in significant part a polemic on property, but also 
on properties, propriety, the proper (sec also de 
Man in this regard, especially the chapter on 
Rousseau's Social Contract in Allegories of Read-
ing); docs the breadth of his critique make it also a 
blunted instrument, a flock of missives straying 
into an array of missiles? Competence being a 
matter of degree, still: more competent letters fired 
at incompetent warheads? 
Revelation, though, is one thing humanity 
docs have. Assuming an apocalyptic tone, a" la the 
sophists ("mystagogues") chastised by Kant, is one 
means to subvert systems and to keep the ball 
rolling (or world turning). It would seem a cardinal 
principle of intertextuality, however, that the war 
of words cannot be won, not on/in its own terms 
anyway. Consider what's typically said about 
superpower summit meetings: "At least they're 
talking." The talkers here are truly the mys-
tagogues of which Kant writes. As though the 
words are the main thing, as though wars are 
fought over words, and as though wars could be 
avoided if only the right words could be found. 
Dcrrida, of course, doesn't fall for this line of 
argument—he is always careful to recognize the 
interconnecting lines of discourse and the various 
materialities of discourse. But there is a Derridean 
argument to be made here: wars may not happen 
for reasons, but they may happen for Reason . That 
is, for Kant's Reason, for the foundation, for the 
logocentric impulse running from Plato to NATO. 
Now, what of memory and Reason? In Plato 
there is of course a very close relation. Everything 
which one knows is not "found out," not "discov-
ered," rather remembered, uncovered . Clearing 
away the influence of the appetites, one sees in the 
pure light of reason the perfect knowledge of which 
all rational beings are privy. Note, however, that 
one docs not remember the past, rather, one uncov-
ers what is present. Today's imperial logocentrists 
are not so articulate or inventive—there are no 
Platos to be found in superpower administra-
tions—but they share this feature with the Socratic 
doctrine found In the Meno: they remember 
only the present. Their introspections uncover 
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p. 295) 
"The anticipation of 
nuclear war (dreaded 
as the fantasy, or phan-
tasm, of a remainder-
less destruction) installs 
humanity—and 
through all sorts of 
relays even defines the 
essence of modern 
humanity—in its 
rhetorical condition. To 
recall this is not to paint 
with verbose vanity the 
horror of the nuclear 
catastrophe which, ac-
cording to some, is 
already degrading our 
world in its totality, or 
improving it by the 
same token, according 
to others; it is not to say 
of this absolute phar-
makon that it is woven 
with words, as if we 
were saying "all this 
horror is nothing but 
rhetoric." ("No 
Apocalypse" p. 24) 
In a discussion of Gilles 
Delcuze, Foucault 
proposes three 
theoretical discourses 
which "fail to grasp the 
event." For example, 
philosophy of history: 
" . . . it encloses the 
event in a cyclical 
pattern of time. Its 
error is grammatical; it 
treats the present as 
framed by the past and 
future: the present is a 
former future where its 
form was prepared and 
the past, which will 
occur in the future, 
preserves the identity 
of its content. First, this 
sense of the present 
principles, they remember "Justice," for instance, 
but never anything so base, so much pertaining to 
the appetites, as the feel of napalm in the morning. 
The materiality of the past is indeed a slippery thing, 
not easily recovered, though. To take a clue from 
Foucault, the present is no less dense, no more 
immediate, no less historical. The logoccntrists in 
power have no sense of this density, or, at least, they 
must suppress all such sense, hiding it even from 
themselves. There can be no history of the present 
without history of the past. But a strategy of anti-
logocentrism cannot simply remind us of the past, 
though this is hardly unimportant. This is the 
moment when Derrida tells the Marxists that their 
problem lies in not having read Heidegger, no 
history of the past without history of the present. No 
history without historicity. 
Look, then at Derrida's memoirs for de Man. 
Only occasionally biographical, Derrida's reflec-
tions are for the most part deeply theoretical. But 
then they are reflections upon the life/work of a 
theorist. Some sort of analogy obtains with the 
stories we might tell of the planet, its people, its 
histories. Except that now the shoe is on the other 
foot: we reflect in a deeply theoretical way on the 
ways people live and have lived if we are theorists. 
Our memories, theoretical constructs already, are 
memories of theory. We possess, then, something of 
a basic grasp of historicity, the capacity for thinking 
back through the passageways of reason, and we 
therefore are partially prepared for a task of future 
telling and retelling. However, only a third of our 
work—if that—is done in carrying out this essen-
tially hermencutic task. Two tasks remain. 
First, typical projections, predictions of the fu-
ture trajectories of Reason, History, Memory as ty-
rannical emissaries, as non-stratified, non-monu-
mental organizing concepts under the sign of Rea-
son; something about us will have always been the 
same and will always remain the same. De Man's 
"Criticism and Crisis" is precisely to this point, and 
the essay brings out the latent Euroccntrism of the 
"crisis of Reason" (History, Humanity, etc.) concept. 
Though talk of the "end of philosophy" may be a bit 
ofaruse, ho wever,talkoftheend of humanity can be 
deadly serious in the present world situation. Talk 
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requires a logic of 
essences (which 
establishes the present in 
memory) and of concepts 
(where the present is 
established as a knowl-
edge of the future), and 
then a metaphysics of a 
crowned and coherent 
cosmos, of a hierarchical 
world." ("Theatrum Phi-
losophicum" pp. 175-76) 
"The power of memory 
does not reside in its 
capacity to resurrect a 
situation or a feeling that 
actually existed, but it is 
a constitutive act of the 
mind bound to its own 
present and oriented 
toward the future of its 
own elaboration." 
(Blindness and Insight, 
p. 92;dtedinDerrida, 
Memoires, p. 59) 
'"Memory'... is first the 
name. . . of what for us 
(an "us" which I define 
only in this way) 
preserves an essential 
and necessary relation 
with the possibility of 
the name, and of what in 
the name assures preser-
vation." (Memoires, p. 
49) 
" . . . if there are wars 
and a nudear threat, it is 
because 'deterrence' has 
neither 'original 
meaning' nor measure. 
Its logic' is the logic of 
deviation and transgres-
sion, it is rhetorical-
strategic escalation or it 
is nothing at all. It gives 
itself over, by calcula-
tion, to the incalculable, 
to chance and luck." " . . . 
it is a question here of an 
necessarily has its teleology: conversations begin 
and end. Thus another task remains. 
Second, then, the work of disruption. Ending 
with disruption is to my mind the best insurance of 
not ending, of creating an opening for a writerly or 
intcrtcxtual politics. Not that any insurance policy 
will do the trick. Some of the current writers on de-
construction write of "disrupting" or "overturn-
ing" hierarchies as though this is a purely rhetori-
cal operation. The claim on my part is not that the 
rhetorical work is unimportant (though I have a 
difficult time seeing that some deconstructionists 
have much grasp of the possible timeframe which 
may be involved here), rather that this work must 
be understood as interfaced at every level with 
other dimensions of the social text. 
The trick—it is more art than science—is to 
disrupt closure. The means are varied: the Utopian 
as|wct, for example, cannot be ignored—nor 
should it be. Writing in the Derridean sense par-
takes of this Utopian aspect in not closing the book 
of life, not counting all of the names which may be 
written there (refusal of a certain reading and a 
certain mathematics, the reading and mathematics 
of certainty). Writing is a call to the imagination, 
not the anti-imaginary reality of The Late, Great 
Planet Earth . L'Imaginationau Pouvoir ? Yes, more 
than we knew, it is power over/of life and death. 
Nothing can be taken a way, but an addition to reve-
lation is always possible, given the audacity to 
write the memoirs of another. 
"Let me say a word first about speed. At the 
beginning there will have been speed and 
these stakes appear in the experience of a race, or 
more preciselyof acompetition Asnodoubt 
we all know, no singleinstant, no atom of our life (of 
our relation to the world and to being) is not 
marked today, directly or indirectly, by that speed 
race." 
—"No Apocalypse, Not Now" 
Words in blood: "I am Alpha and Omega, the 
beginning and the end, the first and the last. And, 
behold, I come quickly; and my reward is with me, 
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aleatory element that 
appears in a hetero-
genous relation to 
every possible 
calculation and every 
possible decision. That 
unthinkable clement 
offers itself to (be) 
thought in the age 
when a nuclear war is 
possible: one, or rather, 
from the outset, some 
scndings, many 
scndings, missiles 
whose destinerrance 
and randomness may, 
in the very process of 
calculation and the 
games that simulate the 
process, escape all 
control, all reasstmila-
tion or self regulation of 
a system that they will 
have precipitously (too 
rapidly, in order to 
avert the worst) but 
irreversibly destroyed." 
("No Apocalypse", p. 
29) 
I here the manuscript leaves off). (Revelation 22: 13, 
12) 
Discussion; participating were: Bill Martin, Marc 
Lennox, Rhonda Faber, and Alexis Harrison. 
Marc Lennox: I must admit to thinking Derrida 
somewhat of a sophist, or to use his term, "mys-
tagogue." Mightn't it be said that, fine, Derrida is 
now polcmicizing against nuclear war, and he has 
shown the warplanners up for incompetent fools, 
but, on balance, he has also obscured certain central 
issues which need most to be sharpened to the 
utmost clarity? And, if anything, it would seem that 
you have only made the obscure a bit fuzzier. 
Bill Martin: Where to begin? It's not clear whether 
a "satisfactory" response would be more to give an 
apology for what for shorthand I'll call 
the"Derridean approach" or to now "come clean" 
and give the "straight reading." But I won't do 
either, though I'll be happy to give a "straight" 
explanation for not going straight. Perhaps this will 
be acceptable at some level of metasatisfaction. It 
seems to me that what's most mystifying in the case 
of attempting to understand the bases for nuclear 
conflict—and in fact in attempting to understand the 
workings of contemporary society in anything like a 
sophisticated fashion—is all the "straight talk," the 
conventional wisdom which gets dressed up as 
theory. This is not a time of conventions, at least not 
when it comes to talk of warfare (and I do agree with 
Derrida, there isn't "one atom of our lives" which is 
not touched by what he calls the "speed race"); so, 
"wisdom," of the diversionary sort that we are espe-
cially used to hearing from the major media is the last thing we need. Even 
prior to 1945 warfare was beginning to overrun not only conventions, but even 
any serious talk of conventions. Now, with the nuclear threat exceeding what 
could even in some extremely non-conventional sense be called "warfare"— 
what are the objectives, strategics, etc.?—it is more than ever necessary to 
disrupt whatever linguistic conventions, and therefore, certainly, philosophi-
"Heidegger reminds us 
of the fact that Leibnitz, 
who was the author of 
the formula of the 
Principle of Reason 
(Der Slaz vom Grund ), 
was also supposed to 
be the author of 
insurance, as we know 
it." ("No Apocalypse", 
p.27n) 
(Editor's Note: The following discussion notes were read as part of the paper 
presented at the Illinois Graduate Student Confcronce.l 
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calconventions, that maintain thcruseof "orderly conflict." Here, you sec, lam 
of course following a certain Dcrridean convention: "parasiticdiscourse." That 
is, nuclear weapons themselves—and the social systems of which the are an 
extension; I, like Lenin, followClausewitz in this regard—have demanded, pos-
sibly more so than even the voice of God could, the transgression of all 
boundaries which present themselves as conventional, natural, necessary. 
Alexis Harrison: Still, there were many parts of your presentation which 
seemed to me either unnecessarily opaque or simply botched—well, to lay it on 
the line, perhaps deliberately botched by a kind of verbal shadow-boxing. 
Bill Martin: Yes, well, I did mean to complete my remarks just now with 
perhaps just a bit of an apology: the clarity 1 would not hesitate to polemicize 
against is a certain "hi-tech" resolution (with the double-entendre intended) 
which, as I've been attempting to say, obscures by its apparent clarity. Perhaps 
I'm not so far from the kinds of critique of instrumentalism offered by the 
Frankfurt School or by Heidegger in his essay on technology. But you probably 
had some more specific problems in mind . . . 
Alexis Harrison: Well, one connection which seemed tenuous to me is the line 
you draw between a person, namely Paul de Man, or at least the memory of this 
person, and nuclear war, a war which will involve all persons. 
Bill Martin: And all "potential" persons, as well as, in fact, all persons whom 
have ever lived. For all intents and purposes, the very notion of persons will be 
erased. History will not only not be, it will not have been. Likewise memory. 
This is the connection. Or, rather, this is the opening which allows many 
connections, many of which have not been drawn here today, and many of 
which I only hinted at (perhaps, no doubt, in a way which was obscure). As you 
know, memory was an important subject for de Man, especially as it relates to 
the rhetorical structures of history and temporality. Secondly, the relation 
between crisis and apocalypse could be traced much further—it's not for no 
reason that crisis rhetoric has been one of the main currencies of this century. 
Apocalyptic rhetoric, on the other hand, seems part of a deeper economy. One 
of the essential problems for radical social theory nowadays is to better situate 
the economy of modernism within the deep economy of western metaphysics. 
And, I hasten to add, vice-versa. It may be proposed that the problem of 
modernity is simply superficial in comparison to the deeper questions of logo-
centrism and western metaphysics "as a whole." Perhaps so; but I would 
argue—or at least I put this forward as a very significant possibility—that only 
through pursuing the former will we come to terms with the latter. This to me 
is the "Heidegger - Marx question." Third, in linking the writing of a memoir 
(albeit in this case a somewhat unusual memoir) to the question of writing 
history (and the future possibilities thereof)/1 had hoped to draw a line from "a 
life" to life. Here you might say that I used dc Man as a stand-in, in a way not 
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so much unfair to dc Man as toall who livca singular life. That is, in some sense, 
all who live life. The line runs in one direction only, from singular life to life, 
and indeed erases most if not all of what is typically meant by "singular" or 
"individual" life. Though many questionsof contemporary social existenceare 
enough to suggest this erasure, perhaps none arc so persuasive as that of 
nuclear war. 
Rhonda Faber: But, if I could jump in here.. .isn't the enormity of this problem 
exactly what makes it kind of a non-problem? And in that sense, aren't the other 
problems of, as you call it, "contemporary social existence" reinstated with 
even greater force? 
Bill Martin: I certainly don't intend to minimize the importance of other 
problems, but perhaps you could say more about nuclear war being a non-
problem? 
Rhonda Faber: Sure: to put it crudely, if the bombs go off, we've had it, so 
there's little sense in worrying about it. 1 say this not from a cynical or narrow 
point of view—I'm not proposing that we therefore "party till it's 1999." My 
point is that all of the noise about something which it seems unlikely that we'll 
resolve is actually diverting energy away from soluble problems. Don't get me 
wrong—of course I don't want the world to bio w up, but I think that's out of our 
hands—out of the hands of peoplelike you and me and most "ordinary people." 
It's even out of the hands of Derrida! Why not deal, then, with problems that 
ordinary people can have a hand in changing? 
Bill Martin: O.K., now I read you: I'm tempted to wonder, should I neither add 
to or takeaway from this message? If I may be so bold, I prefer to add—though 
in so doing 1 will certainly also take away. There is the sense in which people 
typically speak of a new world war as something which could happen in the 
future. Thankfully we still possess that mode of speaking, though 1, following 
Derrida, have attempted to problcmatize its "sense." In actuality, to be able to 
speak of World War Three as still in "the future" is the precondition for being 
able to speak of anything at all. But there is also a sense, to be sure, in which this 
"next" war has already started, is happening even as we speak. These other 
problems you allude to are marked by this fact, sometimes in ways that arc 
fairly clear. It is easy enough to see the relation bet ween a superpower's welfare 
and warfare functions. What has to be uncovered—where we need more 
revelations—is the relation between this speed race which markseveryatomof 
our lives and the shape of other real questions of contemporary society. To take 
but one—though it is of course not simply one among many, but quitccentral— 
what about all of those issues which are related to gender and the situation of 
women? Does this war have a gender? Arc the many questions of gender now 
marked by this war? To both questions I offer an immediate "yes." Still, the 
lines must be traced, and some of the lines are currently being traced through 
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investigations which arc not necessarily predicated upon there being a link. 
Alexis Harrison: So, docs the marking give rise to a teleology? 
Dill Martin: Of a sort. The nuclear question may be the first true question of the 
end of history. The desire for there to be, once and for all, such a question, is a 
very long-standing desire, identified by Freud with the death-wish. Now 
humanity has simultaneously come into possession of a true teleological 
question and an "answer." The problem now is, seeing the true shape of that 
which we so desperately wanted, to back off from this finality and to continue 
the conversation in other terms. But I see that we're just about out of t i m e . . . 
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